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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we describe our approach and discuss evaluation re-
sults for the MediaEval 2012 Visual Privacy task. The goal of the
task is to obscure faces of people visible in provided surveillance
clips to preserve their personal privacy. We also additionally as-
sume, although it is not explicitly stated in the task description,
that the privacy protection should be done in an automated way and
the applied privacy tool should be reversible and prone to attacks.
We use a combination of a face detection algorithm and transform-
domain scrambling technique, which pseudo-randomly scrambles
bits during encoding, that was applied to the detected face regions.
The evaluations of the resulted automated privacy protection tool
showed that inaccuracies of the face detection algorithm affected
both objective and subjective results. An interesting finding is how-
ever that scrambling, while being non-distractive to the evaluating
subjects, appeared significantly irritating with score of 0.8, but only
for ’evening’ subset of the dataset.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.10 [Artificial Intelligence]: Vision and Scene Understanding—
video analysis, representations, data structures, and transforms
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Visual Privacy tasks focuses on the problem of privacy pro-
tection in video surveillance, which is gaining more and more at-
tention from research community and concerned public. Wide and
growing adoption of video surveillance systems, their intrusive na-
ture into personal space, and general social aspect of such systems
present several challenges to the tools aiming on preserving pri-
vacy. The main challenges, specified in Visual Privacy task this
year, include obfuscation of faces and supporting accessories (i.e.,
scarf, cap, or glasses) of people in a given surveillance scenario and
making such obfuscation visually pleasing, i.e., socially acceptable.
Many existing tools, such as blurring, pixelization, or masking, for
protection of personal privacy in image and video do not respond
well to the defined challenges. Therefore, we participated in this
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challenge to start creating a comprehensive and socially acceptable
tool for protection of visual privacy.
In addition to the challenges specified in the Visual Privacy task
description, we assume that a privacy protection tool should be
fully automated, without any manual pre-processing. Since the
goal of the task is to obscure faces of the persons in the video, we
employed a face detection algorithm from the OpenCV library1.
Also, we assume that obfuscation of faces in a video should be
done in a reversible manner, so the original version of the video
can be recovered if necessary, as opposed to such irreversible and
simple techniques like blurring or pixelization. Several reversible
approaches to obfuscation of regions in video exist, such as encryp-
tion of selected regions [1], complete removal of sensitive regions
from the video [5] (encoding and storing them separately), trans-
mitting only the information necessary to perform the surveillance
task at hand with information about sensitive regions superimposed
on the main stream as separately encrypted and encoded visual ob-
jects [3]; other notable techniques also include anonymization [4].
In this challenge, however, we use a transform-domain scram-
bling technique [2], where pixels in the sensitive regions are scram-
bled in a pseudo-random way based on a secret key. The scram-
bling is done during encoding process by randomly flipping sig-
nificant bits of DCT components of the video frames (assuming
MPEG-4 encoding). Unscrambling can be performed by flipping
back the bits of DCT components during decoding process, pro-
vided the pseudo-random algorithm is seeded with the same key.
Since the scrambling is done on DCT components and not pix-
els directly, the resulted scrambled video is highly tolerant to later
modifications, alterations, and security attacks. Even after such al-
terations, the scrambled video can be unscrambled with very little
loss in visual quality, which makes this technique highly attractive
to use in practical applications, such as video surveillance.
2. PRIVACY PROTECTION TOOL
We built an automated visual privacy protection tool using Vi-
sual C++. The tool essentially combines OpenCV face detection
algorithm with scrambling algorithm that is based on MPEG-4 en-
coding standard software.
2.1 Detecting Faces
Since videos in the provided dataset were very different in terms
of lighting (shot during evening and morning) and visibility of the
faces (faces of various sizes, occlusions from caps, scarfs, and sun-
glasses), tuning face detection algorithm from OpenCV was a chal-
1http://opencv.org/
lenge. Based on the training videos, we had come up with the fol-
lowing tuning parameters to achieve the best tradeoff between the
number of false and true positives. We set to 5 the minimum num-
ber of neighbour rectangles combined into object. The pruning flag
of the algorithm was set to CANNY. The size of the scanning win-
dow was decreased to 10 × 10 pixels from the default 20 × 20
pixels, because many videos in the dataset had very small faces (as
people walked further away from the camera), so the smaller search
window would help to detect more faces.
Despite the tuning efforts, the face detection under performed,
especially, on videos from the ’evening’ subset and on videos with
occlusions (scarf, cap, and sunglasses).
2.2 Scrambling Detected Regions
We run the face detection algorithm on each frame for each in-
put video. Resulted bounding boxes around faces are saved into the
binary video mask file. Since scrambling is implemented as a com-
ponent of the MPEG-4 standard encoder (software for one of the
pre-final standard drafts), we set the corresponding configuration
files for the scrambled encoding for each video, which can have a
different frame rate and resolution. Our scrambling technique ran-
domly changes bits of 63 DCT coefficients for every macro block
in a given video frame. The final output of the scrambling is an
MPEG-4 video.
3. EVALUATION RESULTS
Results obtained with the objective evaluation tool provided by
the organisers demonstrated the weaknesses of the OpenCV face
detection algorithm. Accuracy of the detection is reported as 0.24
on average, with almost no detections for videos with occlusions.
One possible reason for such detection results is the over-conservative
choice of values for tuning parameters of the algorithm. The PSNR
and SSIM metrics for scrambled videos are 28.26 and 0.92 respec-
tively, which are moderately high, especially since videos were re-
encoded with older standard draft, which encodes less efficiently
than the currently used MPEG-4 encoder.
The subjective evaluations are summarised in Figure 1 and Fig-
ure 2. Ideally, we would like to have high privacy scores (visual
privacy is preserved) and high intelligibility scores (surveillance
task is not obstructed by privacy protection), but, in reality, there is
a tradeoff between privacy and intelligibility. Since no face detec-
tion algorithm has 100% of the detection accuracy, in some video
frames, faces remained undetected and hence unscrambled. As the
whole videos were played back to the subjects during evaluations,
those unscrambled faces led to low subjective privacy scores (see
data for EPFL in Figure 1).
Although face detection had a significant impact on the with pri-
vacy and intelligibility scores, irritation and distraction (Figure 2)
should only be affected by the privacy protection technique itself.
Interestingly, our scrambling approach shows significantly high ir-
ritation score, but only for videos from the ’evening’ subset. A
possible explanation could be that evening videos after scrambling
appeared more unnatural or ’scary’ to the subjects due to a poorer
lighting. But since there is no such questionary data available, this
hypothesis should be explored further by studying the irritation ef-
fect of scrambling on people.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The main focus of our approach, when participating in a Visual
Privacy task, was on combining together in a single tool an auto-
mated face detection and reversible scrambling technique that is
prone to attacks. Evaluation results show that a better face detec-
Figure 1: Privacy vs. intelligibility for different participants.
Figure 2: Irritation vs. distraction for different participants.
tion algorithm is necessary, while irregularity in the irritation scores
suggest the need to develop a more comprehensive tests for irrita-
tion and distraction subjective factors and investigate these effects
of scrambling technique further.
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